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Abstract
Is a more heterogeneous population conducive or detrimental to capital accumulation and
economic growth? This paper addresses this question using a dynamic general equilibrium
model with ex ante heterogeneous consumers and progressive taxation. We show that the
answer depends crucially on the shape of the marginal tax function. If this function is
concave, then a more heterogeneous population will have a lower average marginal tax rate
and a higher level of capital accumulation. The opposite is true when the marginal tax
function is convex. These results are robust in a variety of models with either exogenous or
endogenous economic growth.
Keywords: Consumer Heterogeneity, Progressive Taxation, Economic Growth.
JEL classication: D31, E62.
Department of Economics, 365 Faireld Way, Unit 1063, University of Connecticut, Storrs CT 06269-1063.
Email: sieglindwang@hotmail.com.
yCorresponding Author: Department of Economics, Astley Clarke Building, University of Leicester, Leicester
LE1 7RH, United Kingdom. Phone: +44 116 252 2880. Email: mhs15@le.ac.uk.
1
1 Introduction
Is a more heterogeneous population conducive or detrimental to capital accumulation and eco-
nomic growth? What role does redistributive policy, such as progressive taxes, play in this
matter? In this paper, we address these questions using a dynamic general equilibrium model
with ex ante heterogeneous consumers. Our main focus is on the relation between ex ante
heterogeneity and long-term economic performance.1
The economic e¤ects of diversity have long been a subject of interest among researchers.2
Several recent studies have provided empirical evidence on the positive e¤ect of ethnic and cul-
tural diversity on productivity and economic growth (e.g., Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Ager and
Brückner, 2013, Alesina et al., 2013; Trax et al., 2015).3 One common hypothesis is that a more
heterogeneous population brings forth a greater variety of skills which are complementary inputs
in the production process, and thus enhances overall productivity.4 In the present study, we
explore a di¤erent mechanism through which diversity can a¤ect aggregate economic outcomes.
Our approach highlights the role of ex ante heterogeneity in determining the distribution of
marginal tax rates across individuals. In the context of representative agent models, the neg-
ative relation between marginal tax rate and capital accumulation is straightforward and well
understood: a decrease in marginal tax rate raises the return of savings which in turn promotes
capital accumulation.5 The novelty of this study is to show that in a heterogeneous economy, a
change in the characteristics of the underlying population can lower the e¤ective marginal tax
rate, even when there is no change in the tax schedule per se. To achieve this in a tractable
manner, we adopt a similar deterministic framework as Sarte (1997), Li and Sarte (2004), Car-
roll and Young (2008, 2011) and Angyridis (2015). In this type of model, ex ante consumer
1This study is concerned with consumers di¤erences in some xed, predetermined characteristics that are
directly related to their choices, namely preferences and labour productivity. These di¤erences can be due to
ethnic, cultural, physiological or other factors. We are agnostic about the origin of these di¤erences. Throughout
this paper, we will treat the terms diversityand ex ante heterogeneityas synonymous.
2For extensive survey of this literature, see Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Alesina et al. (2013).
3The analyses in Ottaviano and Peri (2006), Ager and Brückner (2013) and Trax et al. (2015) are based on
micro-level data from developed countries, such as Germany and the United States. Alesina et al. (2013), on
the other hand, conduct cross-country comparisons using aggregate level data from 195 countries. Other cross-
country studies, such as Easterly and Levine (1997) and Collier and Gunning (1999), focus on African countries
and report a negative relation between ethnic diversity and economic growth.
4See, for instance, Ottaviano and Peri (2006, p.12-13) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005, Section 2).
5Empirical evidence on this is scant, however, mainly because of the di¢ culty in measuring marginal tax rate.
For this reason, many studies focus on the relation between average tax rate and economic growth. One exception
is Padovano and Galli (2001) which construct country-wide point estimates of e¤ective marginal tax rate for 23
OECD countries over the period 1951-1990 and show that this measure is negatively correlated with economic
growth. The question of how the distribution or dispersion of marginal tax rates would a¤ect economic growth,
however, remains unexplored.
2
heterogeneity provides the source of income and wealth inequality.6 Progressive taxation comes
into play by distorting prices and incentives, which in turn inuences how ex ante heterogeneity
translates into ex post economic inequality. The present study adds to this line of research in
two ways: First, while ex ante heterogeneity plays a central role in this type of model, virtually
no attention has been paid to understand how a change in the distribution of consumer charac-
teristics would a¤ect the aggregate economy. This gap is lled in this paper. Second, when it
comes to modelling progressive taxation, existing studies typically focus on a specic parametric
form of the tax schedule, which connes our understanding of the e¤ects of progressive taxes.
We depart from this practice and conduct our analysis based on some generic properties of the
progressive tax function.
Using this approach, we show that the economic e¤ects of diversity depend crucially on an
often overlooked feature of the progressive tax schedule, namely the concavity and convexity of
the marginal tax function. If this function is concave, then a more heterogeneous population will
have a lower average marginal tax rate and a higher level of capital accumulation. The opposite is
true when the marginal tax function is convex.7 The intuition of this can be seen by considering
the following example: Start with a homogeneous economy in which all consumers are ex ante
identical, receive the same amount of before-tax income and face the same progressive tax
schedule. Suppose now a mean-preserving dispersion in consumer characteristics is introduced.
Such dispersion will lead to a non-degenerate distribution in before-tax income and marginal
tax rate. In particular, the relatively poor consumers in the heterogeneous economy will pay
a lower marginal tax rate than in the homogeneous world, and the relatively rich will pay a
higher rate. The shape of the marginal tax function matters when it comes to aggregation. If
the marginal tax function is concave, then the decrease in marginal tax rate among the poor
will outweigh the increase among the rich. As a result, the heterogeneous economy will have a
lower average marginal tax rate than the homogeneous economy.8 Our main results in Section
3 generalise this comparison to any two heterogeneous economies which are otherwise identical
except for the degree of ex ante heterogeneity. We also generalise these results to a variety of
models with either exogenous or endogenous economic growth.
6This type of model implicitly assumes the existence of perfect consumption insurance so that individuals
choices are not a¤ected by idiosyncratic risks. Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Huggett et al. (2011) argue that
predetermined di¤erences are more important than idiosyncratic risks in explaining the dispersion in lifetime
wealth and lifetime utility.
7 If a progressive tax function  () is thrice di¤erentiable, then the implied marginal tax function is concave
(or convex) if and only if the third-order derivative  000 () is negative (or positive).
8The e¤ects under a convex marginal tax function are similar but in opposite directions.
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It is important to note that almost all of the existing quantitative studies on progressive
taxation have adopted a specication which implies a concave marginal tax function (see Section
3 for details). But the relation between this and the distribution of marginal tax rates has not
been fully explained until now.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the baseline model. Section
3 presents the main results which are based on a comparison between two economies with
di¤erence degrees of ex ante heterogeneity. Section 4 shows that our main results can be readily
extended to a variety of growth models. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Baseline Model
2.1 Consumers
Time is discrete and is denoted by t 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g : The economy under study is inhabited by
S > 1 innitely lived consumers with di¤erent time preference and labour productivity.9 Let
i 2 (0; 1) be the subjective discount factor of the ith consumer, i 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg ; and let "i > 0
denote his labour productivity. Both characteristics are predetermined and constant over time.
There is a single commodity in this economy which can be used for consumption and invest-
ment. Let ci;t be the consumption of the ith consumer at time t: All consumers have preferences
over consumption sequences, which can be represented by
1X
t=0
tiu (ci;t) : (1)
All consumers have the same utility function u () which has the following properties.10
Assumption A1 The utility function u : R+ ! R is twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly
increasing, strictly concave and satises the Inada condition, i.e., lim
c!0
u0 (c) = +1:
In each period, each consumer is endowed with one unit of time which they supply inelasti-
cally to work. The labour income of the ith consumer at time t is wt"i; where wt is the wage
rate for an e¤ective unit of labour. Consumers can save and borrow through a single risk-free
9Time preference heterogeneity has been previously considered in Sarte (1997), Li and Sarte (2001), Carroll
and Young (2011), Suen (2014) and Angyridis (2015) among others. The empirical evidence on this type of
heterogeneity is reviewed in Frederick et al. (2002).
10Allowing for heterogeneity in the utility function would not change our main results. See Footnote 15 and
Section 4 for details.
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asset. Let ai;t be the ith consumers asset holdings at the beginning of time t: The consumer
is in debt if this variable takes a negative value. The interest income (or interest payment)
associated with these assets is rtai;t; where rt is the interest rate. The sum of these two types
of income, denoted by yi;t  wt"i + rtai;t; is subject to a progressive tax.11 The tax schedule is
represented by a function  () ; which has the following properties.
Assumption A2 The tax function  : R+ ! R+ is continuously di¤erentiable, strictly in-
creasing and strictly convex with  (0)  0: It also satises  (y) < y and 0 <  0 (y) < 1 for all
y > 0:
The assumption of a convex tax function (or equivalently an increasing marginal tax function)
is often referred to as marginal rate progressivity. This, together with  (0)  0; is equivalent to
average rate progressivity, i.e., average tax rate  (y) =y is increasing in y:
Consumer is budget constraint at time t is given by
ci;t + ai;t+1   ai;t = yi;t    (yi;t) + t; (2)
where t is a lump-sum net transfer from the government. Taking prices and government policies
as given, each consumers problem is to choose a sequence of consumption and asset holdings
so as to maximize his lifetime utility in (1), subject to the sequential budget constraint in (2)
and the initial value of assets a0 > 0.12 There is no other restriction on borrowing except the
no-Ponzi-scheme condition, which is implied by the transversality condition stated below. The
solution of this problem is completely characterised by the sequential budget constraint in (2),
the Euler equation for consumption
u0 (ci;t) = iu
0 (ci;t+1)

1 +

1   0 (yi;t+1)

rt+1
	
; (3)
and the transversality condition
lim
T!1
8<:
"
TY
t=1
 
1 +  i;t
# 1
ai;T+1
9=; = 0;
11This setup implicitly assumes that interests paid on loans are tax deductible. This assumption is adopted
mainly for analytical convenience. In most countries, interests paid on personal loans are in general not deductible
from taxes. In the United States, for instance, taxpayers can claim deductions on interests paid on student loans
and residential mortgages but not on other types of loans (such as credit card debts).
12The current framework can be easily extended to allow for heterogeneity in initial wealth. But since we focus
on steady-state analysis, this type of heterogeneity is irrelevant for our main results.
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where  i;t  [1   0 (yi;t)] rt is the after-tax return from assets.
2.2 Production
On the supply side of the economy, there is a large number of identical rms. In each period, each
rm hires labour and rents physical capital from the competitive factor markets, and produces
output using a neoclassical production technology
Yt = F (Kt; Nt) ;
where Yt denotes output at time t; Kt and Nt denote capital input and labour input, respectively.
The properties of the production function are summarised as follows:
Assumption A3 The production function F : R2+ ! R+ is twice continuously di¤erentiable,
strictly increasing and strictly concave in (Kt; Nt) : It also exhibits constant returns to scale
(CRTS) in the two inputs and satises the Inada conditions.13
Let Rt be the rental price of physical capital at time t. Then the representative rm solves
the following problem
max
Kt;Nt
fF (Kt; Nt)  wtNt  RtKtg ;
and the rst-order conditions are
Rt = FK (Kt; Nt) ; and wt = FN (Kt; Nt) :
2.3 Government
Tax revenues collected by the government are either spent on unproductivegovernment spend-
ing (Gt) or distributed as transfers to the consumers.14 The governments budget is balanced
in every period, so that
SX
i=1
 (yi;t) = Gt + St; for all t  0: (4)
13Dene f (k)  F (k; 1) as the reduced-form production function. Then the Inada conditions can be expressed
as lim
k!0
f 0 (k) = +1 and lim
k!1
f 0 (k) = 0:
14Government spending is called unproductivebecause it has no direct e¤ect on consumersutility and the
production of goods.
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2.4 Competitive Equilibrium
To dene a competitive equilibrium, we rst dene ct = (c1;t; c2;t; :::; cS;t) and at = (a1;t; a2;t; :::; aS;t)
as the cross-sectional distributions of consumption and assets at time t: The exogenous policy
instruments include a progressive tax function  () and a sequence of government spending
fGtg1t=0 : Given these policy variables, a competitive equilibrium consists of sequences of distrib-
utions fct;atg1t=0 ; aggregate inputs fKt; Ntg1t=0 ; prices fwt; rt; Rtg1t=0 and government transfers
ftg1t=0 such that
(i) Given prices and government policies, fci;t; ai;tg1t=0 solves consumer is problem.
(ii) Given prices, fKt; Ntg1t=0 solves the representative rms problem in every period.
(iii) The governments budget is balanced in every period.
(iv) All markets clear in every period, so that Kt =
PS
i=1 ai;t; and Nt =
PS
i=1 "i; for all t:
In the present study, we focus on the stationary equilibria or steady states of this economy.
Both Gt and t are time-invariant in a stationary equilibrium. Dene kt  Kt=Nt as the capital-
labour ratio at time t and let k denote its value in a steady state. In any stationary equilibrium,
the prices are given by R = FK (k; 1) ; w = FN (k; 1) and r = R ; and the Euler equation
can be expressed as
1 = i

1 + r

1   0 (yi )
	)  0 (yi ) = 1  ir ; (5)
where i = 1=i   1 is the rate of time preference of the ith consumer.15 Equation (5) states
that in any stationary equilibrium each consumer faces an after-tax asset return that is equal
to his rate of time preference.16 This condition implicitly denes a one-to-one mapping between
yi and i; which forms the basis of our analysis.
To start, dene  : (0; 1)! R+ as the inverse of the marginal tax function, i.e.,  [ 0 (y)] = y
for all y  0: Since  0 () is continuous and strictly increasing, its inverse is a single-valued, contin-
uous, strictly increasing function. Suppose for the moment that  () is also thrice di¤erentiable,
15Since individual consumption (and hence the marginal utility of consumption) is constant over time in any
steady state, equation (5) remains valid even if we allow for heterogeneity in the utility function, i.e., ui () 6= uj ()
for some i; j 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg and i 6= j:
16As shown in Sarte (1997), this condition implies a non-degenerate distribution of wealth in the steady state.
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then the rst and second-order derivatives of  () exist and are given by
0

 0 (y)

=

 00 (y)
 1
> 0;
00

 0 (y)

=  
0 [ 0 (y)]  000 (y)
[ 00 (y)]2
? 0 i¤  000 (y) 7 0:
The last equation reveals a close connection between the curvature of  () and that of  0 () :
Specically,  () is a convex (or concave) function if and only if  0 () is concave (or convex). The
same result can be obtained without using  00 () and  000 () : This is formally stated in Lemma
1. The proofs of all lemmas and propositions can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 Suppose Assumption A2 is satised. Then  () is a convex (or concave) function if
and only if  0 () is concave (or convex).
Using (5) and the denition of yi , we can get
yi = 

1  i
r

= w"i + rai : (6)
Equation (6) implies that, cross-sectionally, the level of before-tax income is inversely related to
the rate of time preference. Summing this equation across all consumers gives
SX
i=1


1  i
r

= "S [F (k; 1)  k] ; (7)
where " is the average labour productivity among the consumers, i.e., " PSi=1 "i=S: The right
side of the above equation follows from the CRTS property of the production function. Equation
(7) is essentially an accounting identity which states that the sum of individual income equals
aggregate output (net of depreciation costs). This equation has two important implications:
First, the steady-state value k is independent of the heterogeneity in labour productivity. More
specically, k only depends on the mean of the labour productivity distribution but not other
moments or characteristics. Since w; r and F (k; 1) are uniquely determined by k; it follows
that all these variables are also independent of the heterogeneity in labour productivity. Thus, in
subsequent analysis, we will focus on the e¤ects of time preference heterogeneity alone. Second,
equation (7) provides a direct linkage between the distribution of consumer characteristics  
(1; :::; S) and the aggregate variable k
; without explicitly relating to other variables at the
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individual level (such as yi ). This allows us to adopt the following approach in Section 3: First,
examine how a change in  would a¤ect k; then analyse their joint e¤ects on the distribution
of individual income.
Before proceeding further, we rst examine the existence and uniqueness of steady state in
this economy. To formulate our next result, some additional notations are necessary. Dene
max  max f1; 2; :::; Sg : Then by the strict concavity of f (k)  F (k; 1) and the Inada
conditions of the production function, there exists a unique value kmax > 0 such that f 0 (kmax) =
 + max: Lemma 2 provides a necessary and su¢ cient condition under which a unique steady
state exists.
Lemma 2 Suppose Assumptions A1-A3 are satised. Then a unique steady state exists if and
only if
"S [f (kmax)  kmax] >
SX
i=1


1  i
max

: (8)
3 Main Results
The main results of this paper focus on the e¤ects of consumer heterogeneity on the aggregate
variable k; and the role of progressive taxation in shaping these e¤ects. These results are
based on a comparison between two economies with di¤erent degrees of consumer heterogeneity.
Specically, we consider two economies which have the same size of population S; average labour
productivity "; production technology F () ; and tax function  () : The only di¤erence between
them is the cross-sectional distribution of time preference, denoted by   (1; :::; S) ande  (e1; :::;eS) : Without loss of generality, we assume that the elements in these distributions
are ranked in ascending order, i.e., 0 < 1  2  :::  S and 0 < e1  e2  :::  eS : These
distributions are also required to satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption A4 (i) The two distributions share the same mean, i.e.,
PS
i=1 i =
PS
i=1 ei: (ii)
Both  and e satisfy the condition in (8).
The second part of Assumption A4 ensures that a unique steady state exists in both economies.
Our rst task here is to address the following question: Suppose one economy has a more het-
erogeneous population than the other. Then which economy will have a higher level of capital
accumulation in the steady state? The answer to this question is given in Proposition 3. To
compare the extent of ex ante heterogeneity, we adopt the standard Lorenz dominance criterion.
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Specically,  is said to be more heterogeneous than e if
Pn
i=1 iPS
i=1 i

Pn
i=1 eiPS
i=1 ei ; for n = 1; 2; :::; S: (9)
The rationale for using this criterion is as follows: For any  and e with the same mean,
condition (9) is equivalent to saying that  is a mean-preserving spread of e:17 Thus, in the
present context, a more ex ante heterogeneous economy is one with a more dispersed distribution
of time preference. Let k and ek be the unique solution of (7) under  and e; respectively.
Then a larger extent of ex ante heterogeneity is said to be benecial (or harmful) to long-term
capital accumulation if k  ek (or k  ek).
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumptions A1-A4 are satised. Then a larger extent of ex ante
heterogeneity is benecial (or harmful) to long-term capital accumulation if the marginal tax
function is concave (or convex).
One interesting special case of this result is when e is a degenerate distribution at  PS
i=1 i=S: In this case, we are comparing a heterogeneous-agent (HA) economy to an identical-
agent (IA) economy in which all consumers have the same time preference. Proposition 3 then
implies that the HA economy will have a higher (or lower) level of long-run capital accumula-
tion than the IA economy if the marginal tax function is concave (or convex). This result is
summarised in Corollary 4.
Corollary 4 Suppose Assumptions A1-A4 are satised. Then the HA economy will have a
higher (or lower) level of long-run capital accumulation than the IA economy if the marginal tax
function is concave (or convex).
The intuition of Proposition 3 and its corollary can be obtained by comparing the distribution
of marginal tax rates in the two economies. For ease of explanation, we will focus here on the
comparison between an HA economy and its IA counterpart. The general results are presented
in Proposition 5. In the IA economy, all consumers have the same before-tax income (y) and
face the same marginal tax rate  0 (y) : Introducing a mean-preserving spread in the rate of time
preference will create dispersion in both before-tax income and marginal tax rate. Specically,
it will lower the marginal tax rate for those with income less than y and raise the marginal tax
rate for the others. If the marginal tax function is concave, then the decrease in marginal tax
17See Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007, p.116-119) for more details.
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rates among the relatively poor will dominate the increase among the relatively rich. To see this
more precisely, rst recall that yi is negatively related to i: Thus, y

1 represents the highest
level of income in the HA steady state, and yS is the lowest. For any n 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg ; dene
two groups of consumers according to An = f1; 2; :::; ng and Bn = fn; :::; Sg : In words, An and
Bn represent the richest and the poorest n consumers in the HA steady state, respectively. If
the marginal tax function is concave, then those in Bn will (on average) face a lower marginal
tax rate in the HA economy than in the IA economy, i.e.,
1
S   n+ 1
SX
i=n
 0 (yi )   0 (y) ; for all n 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg :
Since this is also true for B1 (i.e., the entire population), the economy-wide average marginal
tax rate in the HA economy is lower than its IA counterpart. Thus, the consumers in the HA
economy will in general have a larger incentive to save, which then lead to a higher level of
capital accumulation in the steady state.
If the marginal tax function is convex, then the increase in marginal tax rates among the
relatively rich will o¤set the decrease among the relatively poor. As a result, those in An will
(on average) face a higher marginal tax rate in the HA economy than in the IA economy, i.e.,
1
n
nX
i=1
 0 (yi )   0 (y) ; for all n 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg :
The consumers in the HA economy now have a lower incentive to save, which in turn lead to
a lower level of capital accumulation. Proposition 5 generalises the above comparison to any e
that satises Assumption A4.
Proposition 5 Suppose Assumptions A1-A4 are satised. Suppose  is more heterogeneous
than e:
(i) If the marginal tax function is concave, then
PS
i=n 
0 (yi ) 
PS
i=n 
0 (eyi ) ; for all n:
(ii) If the marginal tax function is convex, then
Pn
i=1 
0 (yi ) 
Pn
i=1 
0 (eyi ) ; for all n:
Finally, we turn to the distribution of before-tax income in the two economies. As equation
(6) makes clear, any di¤erence between yi and eyi can be attributed to two factors: (i) a direct
e¤ect due to the di¤erence between i and ei; and (ii) an indirect, general equilibrium e¤ect
due to the di¤erence between r and er: These two forces, however, tend to be counteractive
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regardless of whether  0 () is concave or convex. Thus, in general, it is di¢ cult to compare the
distribution of before-tax income in these two economies. Proposition 6 summarises the exact
nature of these two forces for the case when  0 () is concave. Similar results (but in opposite
directions) can be obtained when  0 () is convex.
Proposition 6 Suppose Assumptions A1-A4 are satised. Suppose  is more heterogeneous
than e: If the marginal tax function is concave, then the following results are true:
(i) For any r  max fS ;eSg ; and for any n 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg ;
nX
i=1


1  ei
r


nX
i=1


1  i
r

: (10)
(ii) For any n 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg ;
nX
i=1


1  i
r


nX
i=1


1  ier and
nX
i=1


1  ei
r


nX
i=1


1  eier

: (11)
Holding r constant, a larger extent of ex ante heterogeneity is associated with a higher average
before-tax income among the relatively rich when  0 () is concave.18 On the other hand, a larger
extent of ex ante heterogeneity will also lead to a lower interest rate (i.e., r  er) when  0 () is
concave as implied by Proposition 3. Holding other things constant, this will lower the average
before-tax income among the top earners in both economies. Note that (10) and (11) does
not imply any ranking between
Pn
i=1 
 
1  ir
  Pni=1 yi and Pni=1 1  eier  Pni=1 eyi
for any n 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg ; thus it is di¢ cult to make any general statements about the income
distribution in these two economies. One way to resolve this is to focus on those  and e that
satisfy a monotone ratioproperty.19
Denition The distributions   (1; :::; S) and e  (e1; :::;eS) satisfy the monotone ratio
property if fei=igSi=1 is a decreasing sequence.
An example of this property is as follows: Suppose 1 = 'e1; for some ' 2 (0; 1) ; S =
(1 + )eS ; for some  > 0; and i = ei for all other i; then  and e satisfy the monotone ratio
property. If  and e have the same mean and satisfy the monotone ratio property, then  is
18The condition r  max fS ;eSg in part (i) ensures that r  i and r  ei for all i: These conditions are
needed because  () is only dened on (0; 1) :
19This is not to be confused with the monotone likelihood ratio property which is often used to compare the
density function of two random variables. We use the term monotone ratio propertybecause of a lack of better
alternatives.
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a mean-preserving spread of e:20 Thus, Propositions 3 and 5 remain valid under this property.
In addition, we can now directly compare the values of yi and eyi for all i: The results are
summarised in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7 Suppose Assumptions A1-A4 are satised. Suppose  and e satisfy the monotone
ratio property.
(i) If the marginal tax function is concave, then there exists an integer q 2 f1; :::; S   1g such
that yi  eyi for i = 1; :::; q; and yi  eyi for i = q + 1; :::; S:
(ii) If the marginal tax function is convex, then there exists an integer n 2 f2; :::; Sg such that
yi  eyi for i = 1; :::; n; and yi  eyi for i = n+ 1; :::; S:
Taken together, Propositions 3, 5 and 7 have the following implications: If the marginal
tax function is concave, then a larger extent of ex ante heterogeneity is associated with a lower
before-tax income among the relatively rich consumers. This lowers the marginal tax rate faced
by these consumers, raises their incentive to save and in turn promotes capital accumulation at
the aggregate level. Another implication is that a smaller share of aggregate income is owned
by the top earners in a more ex ante heterogeneous world. Thus, if we use this as our measure
of income inequality, then income inequality and ex ante heterogeneity are negatively related
when  0 () is concave. The opposite is true when  0 () is convex. In this case, a larger extent
of ex ante heterogeneity will raise the before-tax income among the relatively rich but lower
capital accumulation at the aggregate level. As a result, a larger share of aggregate income is
owned by the top earners in a more heterogeneous world. Hence, income inequality and ex ante
heterogeneity are positively related when  0 () is convex.
Note that under the monotone ratio condition, income inequality (as measured by the share
of aggregate income owned by the top earners) is always negatively related to aggregate capital
accumulation, regardless of whether  0 () is concave or convex.
Discussions
We now relate our main results to the previous studies on progressive taxation. In the existing
literature, two specic forms of progressive tax function are commonly used. The rst one is the
isoelastic function used by Guo and Lansing (1998), Li and Sarte (2004) and Angyridis (2015).
20 In the above example,  and e have the same mean if (1  ')e1 = eS :
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This type of tax function can be written as
 (y) = y1+;
with  > 0 and  > 0: One distinctive feature of this function is that the ratio between marginal
tax rate  0 (y) and average tax rate  (y) =y is always equal to the constant (1 + ). Thus, the
parameter  is often interpreted as a measure of tax progressivity. Under this specication, the
marginal tax function is given by
 0 (y) =  (1 + ) y;
which is concave when   1 and convex when   1: Using tax returns data in the United
States, Li and Sarte (2004) estimate that the value of  in 1985 was 0.88 and the value in 1991
was 0.75, both imply a strictly concave marginal tax function.
Another commonly used tax function is the one proposed and estimated by Gouveia and
Strauss (1994),
 (y) = a0
h
y    y a1 + a2  1a1 i :
This functional form was adopted by Sarte (1997), Conesa and Krueger (2006), Erosa and
Koreshkova (2007), Carroll and Young (2011) among others. The rst, second and third-order
derivatives of this tax function are given by
 0 (y) = a0

1  (1 + a2ya1) 

1+ 1
a1

;
 00 (y) = a0a2 (1 + a1) (1 + a2ya1)
 

2+ 1
a1

ya1 1;
 000 (y) =
 00 (y)
y

a1   1  (2a1 + 1)

a2y
a1
1 + a2ya1

: (12)
In all existing applications, the parameters a0, a1 and a2 are taken to be strictly positive so as to
ensure  00 (y) > 0: Gouveia and Strauss (1994) report an estimate of 0.768 for a1 based on U.S.
data. Similar values are also used in Sarte (1997) and Conesa and Krueger (2006). From (12), it
is obvious that 0 < a1  1 implies  000 () < 0: In their quantitative analysis, Carroll and Young
(2011) have also considered counterfactual experiments in which a1 > 1: In this case, there exists
a unique threshold value of income below which  000 (y) > 0 and above which  000 (y) < 0:
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In sum, under the conventional specication of progressive tax function, our baseline model
will predict a positive relation between ex ante heterogeneity and long-run capital accumulation.
4 Extensions
4.1 Exogenous Growth
In this section we show that the main results in Section 3 are robust to the introduction of
exogenous productivity growth. To achieve this, we need to make three changes to the baseline
economy. First, in order to be consistent with balanced growth, the utility function is assumed
to take the CRRA form, i.e.,
u (c) =
c1 
1   ;
where  > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES). Second, the
production technology now includes a labour-augmenting technological factor, which serves as
the engine of growth. The production function is rewritten as
Yt = F (Kt; XtNt) ;
whereXt = t is the technological factor and  > 1 is the constant growth factor. The production
function F () is assumed to have the same properties as in Assumption A3. Finally, we need
to ensure that all consumers face a constant marginal tax rate along any balanced growth path.
To this end, we assume that the progressive tax function, now denoted by Tt (yi;t) ; is changing
over time and the marginal tax rates can be expressed as
T 0t (yi;t) = 
0

yi;t
t

; for all t  0:
As before, the function  0 () : R+ ! (0; 1) is strictly increasing.
Dene the transformed variables: kt  Kt= (XtNt) and byi;t  yi;t=t: The Euler equation for
consumption is now given by

ci;t+1
ci;t

= i

1 + rt+1

1   0 (byi;t+1)	 ; (13)
where rt+1 = FK (kt+1; 1)   : A balanced-growth equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in
which rt+1 remains constant over time while all other variables, such as Kt; ci;t and yi;t; grow by
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the same factor  in every period. Thus, in any balanced-growth equilibrium, we have kt = k;
ci;t+1 = ci;t and byi;t = byi for all t: Substituting these conditions into (13) gives
 = i

1 + r

1   0 (byi )	)  0 (byi ) = 1  1r [ (1 + i)  1] : (14)
Following the same steps as in Section 2.4, we can obtain
SX
i=1


1  1
r
[ (1 + i)  1]

= "S [F (k; 1)  k] ; (15)
where  () is again the inverse of the marginal tax function. Equation (7) is a special case of (15)
with  = 1; but the main di¤erence between the two is that (15) also depends on the consumers
IES. This opens the door for heterogeneity in IES to a¤ect aggregate capital accumulation. We
will defer the discussion of this issue until the end of this section.
Using the same line of argument as in Lemma 2, we can show that a unique balanced growth
equilibrium exists if
"S [F (kmax; 1)  kmax] >
SX
i=1


1  
 (1 + i)  1
 (1 + max)  1

;
where kmax > 0 is the unique value that solves FK (kmax; 1)   =  (1 + max)  1:
The main results of this section are summarised in Proposition 8, which generalise the results
in Proposition 3 to this environment.21
Proposition 8 In the model with exogenous productivity growth, a larger extent of ex ante
heterogeneity is benecial (or harmful) to long-term capital accumulation if the marginal tax
function is concave (or convex).
Suppose now the consumers in this economy di¤er in both their rate of time preference and
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Let (i; i) be the characteristics of the ith consumer.
The rst thing to note is that heterogeneity in IES is consistent with balanced growth in the
presence of progressive taxation. In particular, the consumption of all individuals will again
grow by the same factor  in a balanced-growth equilibrium. Equations (14) and (15) are now
modied to become
 0 (byi ) = 1  1r [i (1 + i)  1] , for all i;
21The proof of Proposition 8 is essentially identical to that of Proposition 3, hence it is omitted.
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SX
i=1


1  1
r
[i (1 + i)  1]

= "S [F (k; 1)  k] :
It is straightforward to show that this economy with two sources of consumer heterogeneity is
observationally equivalent to an economy with time preference heterogeneity alone. To see this,
pick any  > 0 and dene bi  i  (1 + i)   1 for all i: Then the above equations can be
rewritten as
 0 (byi ) = 1  1r  (1 + bi)  1 , for all i;
SX
i=1


1  1
r

 (1 + bi)  1 = "S [F (k; 1)  k] ;
which characterise the equilibrium of an economy in which all consumers share the same IES
(1=) but have di¤erent time preference as captured by b = (b1; :::;bS) : The results in Propo-
sition 8 now correspond to a change in this distribution.
4.2 Endogenous Growth
The main result in Section 3 can also be extended to an environment with endogenous growth.
We will illustrate this using the two-sector model in Li and Sarte (2004, Section II). There
are two types of commodities in this economy: a consumption good (Ct) and an investment
good (It) : As in Li and Sarte (2004), the consumption good is produced by a Cobb-Douglas
production function
Ct = BK

c;tN
1 
c;t ; with B > 0 and  2 (0; 1) ; (16)
where Kc;t and Nc;t denote capital input and labour input, respectively. Investment good is
produced by a linear technology that uses only physical capital as input, so that
It = AKI;t; with A > 0;
where KI;t denote capital input in the investment-good sector. Both goods markets and factor
markets are perfectly competitive. Let Rt be the rental price of physical capital and wt be the
market wage rate. Then the rst-order conditions from the rmsproblem are given by
Rt = A = qtBK
 1
c;t N
1 
c;t and wt = (1  ) qtBKc;tN c;t ;
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where qt is the price of consumption good relative to investment good at time t:
The consumers in this economy solve the following problem
max
fci;t;ai;t+1g1t=0
" 1X
t=0
ti
 
c1 i;t
1  
!#
; with  > 0;
subject to the sequential budget constraint
qtci;t + ai;t+1   ai;t = yi;t   Tt (yi;t) + t;
where Tt () is the tax function at time t. To ensure that the marginal tax rate is constant along
any balanced growth path, we impose the following assumption on the marginal tax function
T 0t (yi;t) = 
0

yi;t
Yt

; for all t  0;
where Yt =
PS
i=1 yi;t denotes aggregate income and 
0 () : R+ ! (0; 1) is a strictly increasing
function. The Euler equation for consumption is given by
qt+1
qt

ci;t+1
ci;t

= i

1 + rt+1

1   0

yi;t
Yt

;
for all i and for all t  0:
In equilibrium, the markets for physical capital and labour are cleared in every period so
that
Kc;t +KI;t =
SX
i=1
ai;t and Nc;t =
SX
i=1
"i:
Any balanced-growth equilibrium will have the following properties: First, the net rate of return
from asset holdings is given by r = A  > 0: Second, the variables fKc;t;KI;t; Ytg will grow by
the same factor in every period and the common growth factor  is endogenously determined.
Finally, Ct and qt will grow by the factor () and ()1  in every period. Substituting these
into the Euler equation gives
()e = i 1 + (A  ) 1   0 (i )	 ; for all i; (17)
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where e  1   (1  ) and i  yi;t=Yt:22 Using this, we can obtain
SX
i=1
i =
SX
i=1


1  1
A  
h
()e (1 + i)  1i = 1; (18)
which is the counterpart of (7). To ensure the existence of a unique solution for (18), it is
necessary to impose some restrictions on the parameter values. Specically, we assume e 
1    (1  ) > 0; which is satised when   1; and (1 +A  ) (1 + min) > 1 + max; where
min and max are the minimum and maximum elements of   (1; :::; S) : Then dene  and
 according to
 

1 +A  
1 + max
 1e
and  

1
1 + min
 1e
:
It can be shown that any solution of (18) must lie within the range
 
; 

; which is nonempty
when e > 0 and (1 +A  ) (1 + min) > 1 + max:23 Finally, dene an auxiliary function
	 :
 
; 
! R+ according to
	 () 
SX
i=1


1  1
A  
h
e (1 + i)  1i :
Then 	
 


> 1 > 	 () is both necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of a unique  that
solves (18). This result is formally stated in Lemma 9.
Lemma 9 Suppose the following conditions are satised: A > ; e  1    (1  ) > 0 and
(1 +A  ) (1 + min) > 1 + max. Then a unique solution of (18) exists if and only if 	
 


>
1 > 	 () :
Finally, we consider the e¤ects of ex ante heterogeneity on the endogenous growth factor
: As in Section 3, we compare two economies which are otherwise identical except for the
distribution of time preference. Both economies are assumed to have a unique balanced-growth
equilibrium.24 We say that a larger extent of ex ante heterogeneity is benecial (or harmful)
to long-term economic growth if the more heterogeneous economy has a higher value of :
Proposition 10 shows that the growth e¤ect of ex ante heterogeneity is again determined by the
shape of the marginal tax function.
22Note that equation (17) can also be obtained in a simple one-sector model with AK production technology
or any other models that can be reduced to the AK model. Thus, the following analysis can also be applied to
these models.
23See the proof of Lemma 9 for more details.
24 In light of Lemma 9, this can be achieved by a suitable choice of the maximum and minimum elements in 
and e:
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Proposition 10 In the model with endogenous growth, a larger extent of ex ante heterogeneity
is benecial (or harmful) to long-term economic growth if the marginal tax function is concave
(or convex).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we examine a largely overlooked mechanism through which diversity can a¤ect
long-term economic performance. Our approach focuses on the e¤ects of ex ante consumer
heterogeneity on the distribution of marginal tax rates across individuals. It is shown that the
concavity or convexity of the marginal tax function holds the key in determining these e¤ects.
One interesting extension of this analysis is to include some form of productive government
spending, such as the provision of public consumption good and investment in infrastructure.
In this case, the negative impact of a higher e¤ective marginal tax rate can be mitigated or
even o¤set by the benets of more useful government spending. Another important direction of
future research is to characterise the transition dynamics induced by a change in the distribution
of consumer characteristics. This type of analysis is important in terms of gauging the welfare
e¤ects of such change.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Pick any two positive real numbers y1 and y2; and any  2 (0; 1) : Then
 0 (y1 + (1  ) y2) ?  0 (y1) + (1  )  0 (y2)
,   0 (y1 + (1  ) y2) ?   0 (y1) + (1  )  0 (y2)
, y1 + (1  ) y2 ? 

 0 (y1) + (1  )  0 (y2)

,   0 (y1)+ (1  )  0 (y2) ?   0 (y1) + (1  )  0 (y2) :
The second line uses the fact that  () is strictly increasing. The third and fourth lines follow
from the identity  [ 0 (y)] = y: Hence,  () is a convex (or concave) function if and only if  0 ()
is concave (or convex). This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2
Dene the reduced-form production function f (k)  F (k; 1) and an auxiliary function G (k) 
" [f (k)  k] ; for all k  0: Since f () is strictly increasing and strictly concave, there exists a
unique value kGR > 0 such that G0 (k) ? 0 if and only if k 7 kGR: Next, consider equations (6)
and (7). Since  () is only dened on (0; 1) ; equation (6) essentially imposes a restriction on the
steady-state interest rate r; which is r  max  max

1;2; :::; S
	
: By the strict concavity
of f () and the Inada conditions lim
k!0
f 0 (k) =1 and lim
k!1
f 0 (k) = 0, there exists a unique value
kmax 2 (0; kGR) such that
f 0 (kmax) =  + max:
Note that r  max if and only if k  kmax: Thus, any solution of (7) must be contained in
the range (0; kmax) : Dene the function H : (0; kmax)! R+ according to
H (k)  1
S
SX
i=1


1  i
f 0 (k)  

:
Since  () is strictly increasing, it follows that H () is strictly decreasing over the range
(0; kmax) : In addition, H (k) > 0 = G (0) for all k  0: As k approaches kmax; H (k) becomes
21
1
S
PS
i=1  (1  i=max) > 0: Thus, a solution of (7) exists if and only if
G (kmax) >
1
S
SX
i=1


1  i
max

:
In addition, a solution if exists must be unique. A graphical illustration of the unique solution
is provided in Figure A1. Once k is known, all other variables in a steady state can be uniquely
determined. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
kmax
G(k)
kGR
H(k)
k* k
Figure A1: Existence and Uniqueness of Steady State.
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of Proposition 3 is built upon Theorem A1, the proof of which can found in Mar-
shall, Olkin and Arnold (2013, Section 2B). Recall that an S-by-S matrix  = [i;j ] is called
doubly stochastic if all its elements are non-negative and all rows and columns sum to one, i.e.,PS
i=1 i;j = 1 for all j and
PS
j=1 i;j = 1 for all i:
Theorem A1 Let   (1; :::; S) and e  (e1; :::;eS) be two vectors of real numbers such
that 0 < 1  2  :::  S and 0 < e1  e2  :::  eS. Then the following statements are
equivalent:
(i)
Pn
i=1 i 
Pn
i=1 ei for n = 1; 2; :::; S   1, and PSi=1 i = PSi=1 ei:
(ii) There exists a doubly stochastic matrix  such that e = :
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Let   (1; :::; S) and e  (e1; :::;eS) be two vectors of real numbers in ascending order
that have the same mean. Suppose condition (9) is satised so that  is more heterogeneous
than e: Then by Theorem A1, there exists a doubly stochastic matrix  = [i;j ] such thate = ; or equivalently,
ei = SX
j=1
i;jj ; for all i 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg : (19)
Suppose the marginal tax function  0 () is concave. By Lemma 1, this is equivalent to  ()
being a convex function. Pick any r such that r > max fS ;eSg : Then we have


1  ei
r

= 
0@ SX
j=1
i;j

1  j
r
1A  SX
j=1
i;j

1  j
r

;
for all i 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg : The equality follows from (19). The inequality follows from the convexity
of  () : Summing the above expression across all consumers gives
SX
i=1


1  ei
r


SX
i=1
SX
j=1
i;j

1  j
r

=
SX
j=1
 
SX
i=1
i;j
!


1  j
r

=
SX
j=1


1  j
r

: (20)
Dene kmax andH () as in the proof of Lemma 2. Similarly dene ekmax according to f 0 ekmax =
 + emax and eH : 0;ekmax! R+ as
eH (k)  1
S
SX
i=1


1  ei
f 0 (k)  

:
Then (20) implies eH (k)  H (k) for all k between zero and minnkmax;ekmaxo : In other words,
changing the distribution of consumer characteristics from  to e would shift the H (k) curve in
Figure A1 down and to the left. Thus, we have k  ek: A similar argument can be used to show
that a convex marginal tax function implies k  ek: This completes the proof of Proposition 3.
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Proof of Proposition 5
First, consider the case when the marginal tax function is concave. Then by Proposition 3, we
have k  ek which implies r  er: Thus, for any n 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg ; we have
SX
i=n
 0 (yi ) = S   n+ 1 
PS
i=n i
r
 S   n+ 1 
PS
i=n ei
r
 S   n+ 1 
PS
i=n eier =
SX
i=n
 0 (eyi ) :
The rst inequality follows from the fact that (9) and
PS
i=1 i =
PS
i=1 ei implies PSi=n i PS
i=n ei: The second inequality follows from r  er: This proves the rst part of the proposition.
Next, consider the case when the marginal tax function is convex. Now we have k  ek
which means r  er: Starting from (5), we can get
nX
i=1
 0 (yi ) = n 
Pn
i=1 i
r
 n 
Pn
i=1 ei
r
 n 
Pn
i=1 eier =
nX
i=1
 0 (eyi ) :
This proves the second part of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 6
The proof of part (i) is built upon some established results in statistics. Let x = (x1; :::; xS) and
z = (z1; :::; zS) be two vectors of real numbers. Let x[1]  x[2]  :::  x[S] denote the elements
of x in descending order and let x(1)  x(2)  :::  x(S) denote the same set of elements but in
ascending order. Similarly, dene z[i] and z(i): Then x is said to be weakly submajorized by z
(denoted by x wz) if
nX
i=1
x[i] 
nX
i=1
z[i]; for all n 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg ; (21)
and x is said to be weakly supermajorized by z (denoted by x wz) if
nX
i=1
z(i) 
nX
i=1
x(i); for all n 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg : (22)
Note that these denitions does not require x and z to have the same mean. A detailed discussion
of these concepts can be found in Marshall, Olkin and Arnold (2013). In particular, the following
result is taken from their Theorem A.2 of Chapter 5 (p.167).
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Theorem A2
(i) For all decreasing convex functions g; x wz implies
(g (x1) ; :::; g (xS)) w (g (z1) ; :::; g (zS)) : (23)
(ii) For all decreasing concave functions g; x wz implies
(g (x1) ; :::; g (xS)) w (g (z1) ; :::; g (zS)) : (24)
This theorem can be applied as follows: First, for any two distributions  and e with elements
in ascending order,
PS
i=1 i =
PS
i=1 ei and (9) imply ew and ew: Second, since   1  r 
is a decreasing function in ; the ranking 1  2:::  S implies


1  1
r

 

1  2
r

 :::  

1  S
r

; for any r  S :
Finally, if  0 () is concave, then   1  r  is a decreasing convex function in . Then using (21)
and (23), we can obtain
nX
i=1


1  ei
r


nX
i=1


1  i
r

; for all n 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg :
This proves the rst part of Proposition 6. If instead  0 () is convex, then   1  r  is a
decreasing concave function in . Then using (22) and (24), we can obtain
SX
i=n


1  i
r


SX
i=n


1  ei
r

; for all n 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg :
Next, according to Proposition 3, a concave marginal tax function implies r  er: Hence,
for any i 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg ; we have


1  i
r

 

1  ier)
nX
i=1


1  i
r


nX
i=1


1  ier :
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This proves the second part of Proposition 6. If  0 () is convex, then we have r  er: By the
same line of argument we can get
SX
i=n


1  ier 
SX
i=n


1  i
r

:
Proof of Proposition 7
Suppose the marginal tax function is concave, which is equivalent to  () being a convex function.
Then by Proposition 3, we have r  er: In addition, the convexity of  () implies
yi   eyi  1  ir  

1  eier

 0

1  eier
eier   ir

; (25)
and
yi   eyi  0 1  ir
eier   ir

: (26)
Since   (1; :::; S) and e  (e1; :::;eS) share the same mean, we have
SX
i=1
(ei   i) = SX
i=1
ei
i
  1

i = 0:
This, together with the monotone ratio property, implies the existence of an integer m 2
f1; 2; :::; S   1g such that i  ei for i = 1; 2; :::;m; and i  ei for i = m + 1; :::; S: This
also implies the existence of q 2 fm; :::; S   1g such that
ei
i
 er
r
, for i = 1; 2; :::; q; and
ei
i
 er
r
; for i = q + 1; :::; S: (27)
Combining (25)-(27) gives yi  eyi for i = 1; 2; :::; q; and yi  eyi for i = q + 1; :::; S: This proves
the rst part of the proposition. A similar argument can be used to establish part (ii).
Proof of Lemma 9
Since the marginal tax rate  0 () is restricted between zero and one, this essentially imposes an
upper bound and a lower bound on the equilibrium growth factor : To see this, rst rewrite
(17) as
 0 (i ) = 1 
1
A  
h
()e (1 + i)  1i ;
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where e  1   (1  ) > 0: Then  0 () > 0 implies
 <

1 +A  
1 + i
 1e
; for all i:
Hence, the equilibrium growth factor is bounded above by  as dened in the text. Likewise,
 0 () < 1 means that  > (1 + i) 
1e for all i: Hence, it is bounded below by : The conditions
e > 0 and (1 +A  ) (1 + min) > 1 + max together ensure that  > :
Dene the function 	 :
 
; 
! R+ according to
	 () 
SX
i=1


1  1
A  
h
e (1 + i)  1i :
Since  () is strictly increasing and e > 0; it follows that 	 () is strictly decreasing over the
range
 
; 

: If 	
 


> 1 > 	 () ; then a unique solution of (18) exists by the intermediate
value theorem. Conversely, if there is a unique  in
 
; 

that solves (18), then it must be the
case that 	
 


> 	 () = 1 > 	 () : This completes the proof of Lemma 9.
Proof of Proposition 10
Let   (1; :::; S) and e  (e1; :::;eS) be two vectors of real numbers in ascending order that
have the same mean. Suppose condition (9) is satised so that  is more heterogeneous than
e: Then by Theorem A1, there exists a doubly stochastic matrix  = [i;j ] such that e = :
Suppose the conditions in Lemma 9 are satised in both economies. Consider the case when the
marginal tax function  0 () is concave, or equivalently,  () is convex. Pick any  that satises
max
(
1
1 + S
 1e
;

1
1 + eS
 1e)
<  < min
(
1 +A  
1 + S
 1e
;

1 +A  
1 + eS
 1e)
:
Then we have


1  1
A  
h
e (1 + ei)  1i = 
0@1  1
A  
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e
0@1 + SX
j=1
i;jj
1A  1
351A

SX
j=1
i;j

1  1
A  
h
e  1 + j  1i ;
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for all i 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg : The equality follows from (19). The inequality follows from the convexity
of  () : Summing the above expression across all consumers gives
	 (; e)  SX
i=1


1  1
A  
h
e (1 + ei)  1i

SX
i=1
SX
j=1
i;j

1  1
A  
h
e  1 + j  1i
=
SX
j=1
 
SX
i=1
i;j
!


1  1
A  
h
e  1 + j  1i
=
SX
j=1


1  1
A  
h
e  1 + j  1i  	 (;) :
Let  and e be the equilibrium growth factor under  and e; respectively. Then we have
	 (; e)  	 (;) = 1 = 	 (e; e) :
Since 	 (; e) is strictly decreasing in ; we have   e: A similar argument can be used
to show that a convex marginal tax function implies   e: This completes the proof of
Proposition 10.
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